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Paying an insurance premium but not needing to claim is sometimes viewed as 
pouring money down the drain. Aversion to the perceived waste may lead to the 
rejection of fair insurance. Although policies paying rebates if no claim is made are 
not attractive to expected utility maximisers, this paper finds strong evidence they 
appeal to waste averters..  
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"Waste is worse than loss"  Thomas Edison 
 
"If something happens and insurance pays, you feel you got your money’s worth. But 
if nothing happens, you’ve been paying out all those premiums – don’t you feel you’ve 
wasted your money? Well, I do." Annemarie Colbin, CEO, The Natural Gourmet 
Institute
3
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Insurance is surely an exception to the maxim that it is desirable to get your money's 
worth. Nevertheless, for many people paying a premium but not suffering a loss 
amounts to pouring money down the drain.
4
 This paper provides evidence that waste 
averters (for example, people who insist on a small portion in a restaurant, even if 
doing so does not reduce the bill) are reluctant to buy insurance.
5
 This tendency can 
be alleviated by higher premium policies paying a rebate if no claim is made 
(cashback insurance). 
 
Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros and Kunreuther (1993) report striking evidence 
consistent with this view. Of their subjects, 57% prefer a cashback policy that is 
strictly dominated by regular insurance. Their explanation involves loss aversion. 
Standard insurance entails two downside events; the premium and, potentially, the 
deductible. The convex value function of Prospect theory implies two small losses are 
worse than a single larger loss of the same aggregate amount. A cashback policy with 
zero deductible may therefore be chosen over regular insurance with a deductible. 
This explanation does not though account for our finding that 52% of respondents 
preferred cashback insurance over zero deductible regular insurance of equal actuarial 
value.
 6
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 As Kunreuther et al. (1978) and Kunreuther and Pauly (2013) argue, it is common for people to 
regard insurance as an investment in which claims are the dividends. Not claiming is therefore a failed 
or wasted investment rather than a fortunate escape. 
5
 There is a psychological literature on waste aversion. For example, Arkes and Blumer (1985) propose 
that waste aversion may be responsible for the sunk-cost fallacy. 
6
 Insurance purchase can be reconciled with risk loving on the downside if loss probabilities are over 
weighted (see Krantz and Kunreuther (2007)). This though implies that a contract that 
overcompensates losses would be preferred to an actuarially equivalent no claim rebate. This seems 
 To investigate the role of waste aversion, we study how the choice of boiler insurance 
depends on a waste-aversion index constructed from questions unrelated to insurance. 
The methodology and data collection procedure is described first. Results are then 
analysed. Finally, brief conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Method  
 
a) Questionnaire design 
Subjects receive details of two insurance policies. One is based on the Npower 
Hometeam 50 contract. This gives a 50% rebate if no claim is made for the year. The 
other policy has no rebate. Both policies pay full repair or replacement costs. 
Participants make hypothetical choices between regular insurance at £12 per month or 
cashback insurance at £x, with x decreasing from 24 in the first question to 12 in the 
last question. The premium for cash-back insurance in each question is set so that a 
risk-neutral expected income maximiser is indifferent if their chance of boiler 
breakdown equals 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1 respectively. Risk-averse subjects with these claim 
probabilities would therefore strictly prefer regular insurance. Rational, attention-
paying respondents select regular insurance in the first few questions and then switch 
to cash-back insurance by £12. Even if waste or loss aversion is present, there will be 
at most one switch point. 
 
Following each choice between regular and cashback insurance, respondents are 
asked whether they prefer to be uninsured. Willingness to pay for cash-back insurance 
is therefore established along with whether regular insurance would be bought at a 
£12 premium if it was the only option available. 
Respondents are also asked the following question:  
Imagine you are offered full insurance at £300 per year. Alternatively, you can get 
insurance at £400 per year and get £200 back if you don't make a claim. Suppose 
                                                                                                                                            
unlikely to be the case. Another reconciliation is that the premium does not involve loss aversion, as in 
Sydnor (2010). Now overcompensation and a no claim rebate are equally preferred, which still seems 
implausible. Braun and Muermann (2004) explain low deductibles by means of regret aversion. This 
operates similarly to waste aversion, though the psychology is different. 
  
your chance of making a claim is 50% so that ON AVERAGE you are equally well off 
financially under these two policies. Which would you choose? 
This question spells out the financial calculation and specifies the exact loss 
probability.  
 
To relate insurance purchase decisions to waste aversion we created a follow up 
survey administered a month later. It aims to capture the extent to which the 
respondent practices waste averting behaviour outside of the insurance context. 
Respondents indicate their level of agreement, from 1, low, to 5, high, with each of 
the following statements: 
 
a) “I walk out of a cinema when I am not really enjoying the film.” 
b) “I always finish reading a book I bought even if I am not enjoying it.” 
c) “If I get a present of perfume or after-shave that I don't really like, I still use it.” 
d) “I save dinner leftovers to eat later.” 
e) “I upgrade my mobile phone as soon as I can.” 
f) “It is better to buy a house than rent it since you own the house when you’ve paid off the 
mortgage.” 
g) “If I joined my local tennis club for an upfront £250 fixed fee which entitles me to play as 
much as I want without extra charge, I would go and play tennis as much as possible to 
make the most out of the fee I paid.”  
h) “I don’t like buying fruit or vegetables on a 2 for 1 offer if I think I may waste some of 
the food.” 
i) “I always throw out food if it's past its use-by date even if it still looks and smells ok.” 
k) “I like the idea of extended warranties because if the gadget breaks down you haven’t 
wasted your money.” 
 
Most of these questions are directly about avoiding waste. The idea behind e) is that a 
waste avoider would not be in a rush to replace a perfectly serviceable phone. 
Question f) reflects the common belief that the problem with renting is that it is 
wasteful because there is nothing to show for it at the end of the day-the mean score 
was 4.3! Answers were aggregated into a single waste-aversion index. 
 
Risk attitudes were measured in two ways. Respondents were asked whether they 
would prefer £1000 or a coin toss paying £4000 for heads and nothing for tails. In 
addition, a five point Likert scale measured the extent of agreement with the 
following statement: 
“I consider myself a risk-taker with respect to financial decisions". 
 
Subjects also reported their estimated chance of boiler breakdown in the coming year.  
 
Data collection 
The questionnaires were administered by the German market research agency, ‘ODC 
Services GmbH’. 325 British gas-boiler owners were recruited. Of these, 39 made 
inconsistent choices such as double switching. The follow-up survey only went to 
consistent subjects of whom 236 responded. 
4. Findings 
The variables used in the regressions are in Table 1 and the regressions reported in 
Table 2.  
Variable name Variable explanation 
Age Respondent’s age 
Cashback chosen 
when breakdown 
probability specified. 
Dummy equal to 1 if a respondent chooses cashback over regular 
insurance with same expected cost when given the probability of 
loss. 
Chance 
Respondent's estimate of the probability of their boiler breaking 
down during the next 12 months.  
Female Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent is female 
Risktaker 
Dummy variable = 1 if a respondent chooses the coin toss rather than 
the sure amount and/or scores in the top two categories for financial 
risk taking 
Income Respondent’s income 
No A-Levels 
Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent does not have A-Levels (an 
academic school-leaving qualification taken at 18) 
Switch to cash-back  
The highest cash-back premium for which a respondent prefers cash-
back insurance to regular insurance 
Switch too soon 
Dummy equals 1 if the respondent switches to cash-back insurance 
too soon, given their estimate of the chance of a boiler breakdown 
Waste aversion Aggregate waste-aversion score. 
Buy regular 
Dummy equals 1 if buys regular insurance at £12 when the cashback 
premium is too high for that to be the preferred option. 
Buy cash-back Dummy equals 1 if a respondent buys cashback at £12. 
Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Waste 
Aversion 
Buy regular Buy cashback 
Switch to 
cashback 
Switch Too 
soon 
Specified-
probability 
cashback 
Waste 
aversion 
 -0.02*** -0.007 0.1** 0.01* 0.044*** 
 (0.317) (0.005) (0.045) (0.005) (0.006)) 
Risk Taker 
0.58 -0.18** 0.006 1.3** 0.14** 0.14* 
(0.83) (0.079) (0.07) (0.56) (0.06) (0.07) 
Chance 
 0.47*** 0.024 * -0.84 0.87*** -0.077 
 (0.15) (0.12) (1.03) (0.12) (0.14) 
Income 
-0.14 -0.01 -0.008 0.09 -0.12 -0.023 
(0.2) (0.019) (0.016) (0.13) (0.15) (0.017) 
No A-Levels 
1.07 -0.043 -0.09 -0.16 0.035 0.12* 
(0.71) (0.07) (0.06) (0.5) (0.057) (0.066) 
Female 
1.15 -0.006 -0.1* -0.59 -.03 -0.1* 
(0.73) (0.07) (0.06) (0.47) (0.05) (0.06) 
Age 
-0.02 0.004 0.006 ** -0.014 -0.002 0.002 
(0.03) (0.003) (0.002) (0.02) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 
34.3*** 0.99 *** 0.78*** 13.2 *** -0.19 -0.73 *** 
(1.92) (0.28) (0.24) (2.02) (0.23) (0.26) 
 n = 236 n = 236 n = 236 n = 236 n=236 n = 236 
 R
2
 adj. = 0.069 R
2
 adj. = 0.1 R
2
 adj. = 0.044 R
2
 adj. = 0.05 R
2
adj.=0.21 R
2
 adj. = 0.23 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level. 
 
The important implications of the numbered regressions are summarised below.  
 
1) Determinants of waste aversion 
Waste aversion is not significantly associated with the other variables indicating in 
particular that it does not proxy for risk preference. 
 
2) Buy regular  
Column (2) indicates that waste averters are significantly less likely to buy regular 
insurance. A one standard deviation increase in waste aversion lowers the purchase 
probability by 0.2. In addition, insurance is more attractive if boiler breakdown is 
likely. Risk aversion increases insurance demand.  
3) Buy cashback  
The aim is to see whether cashback insurance is less affected by waste aversion. To 
eliminate the effect of waste aversion on substitution between policies, the test is 
undertaken at cash-back premium £12, at which regular insurance is dominated. The 
waste-aversion coefficient is negative, as with regular insurance (eq.2), but it is no 
longer significant. Cash-back policies do seem to offset waste aversion.  
 
4) Switch to cash-back  
The dependent variable in column (4) is the cashback premium at which the two 
policies are equally preferred. Increasing waste aversion by one standard deviation 
increases the preference for cashback over regular full-cover insurance by 0.14, 
significant at the 5% level. 
5) Switching too soon 
25% of respondents prefer cash-back insurance at premiums that that lower their 
subjectively evaluated expected income. As cashback is riskier than regular insurance, 
these subjects violate expected utility theory. Waste averters are significantly more 
likely to do so (one standard deviation increase in waste aversion increasing the 
probability of switching too soon by 0.11). So are those with a high chance of boiler 
breakdown. This probably reflects that breakdown probabilities are estimated 
imprecisely estimated and not fully taken into account when choices are made. 
6) Specified-probability Cash-back  
In column 6, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the cash-back policy 
is chosen over regular insurance when the breakdown probability is specified and it is 
explicit that both options deliver equal expected returns. Relative to the switch-too-
soon measure, the proportion of choices inconsistent with expected utility is much 
higher at 52%. A one standard deviation increase in waste aversion raises the 
probability of choosing cashback by 0.44. The cashback effect may be even higher 
here because precise knowledge of probabilities eliminates ambiguity, making the 
risky choice more acceptable, as found by Hogarth and Kunreuther (1995).  
6. Conclusions  
This paper finds that for some subjects, waste aversion resembles a tax on insurance. 
The anticipation that there will be nothing to show for premiums paid diminishes the 
attraction of insurance. Cashback insurance counteracts this effect. No-claims 
bonuses, though normally attributed to the incentive to combat asymmetric 
information, may also have merit as waste-aversion antidotes. 
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